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Abstract
This paper investigates how recent immigration inflows from 2002 to 2008 have affected
wages in Switzerland. This period is of particular interest as it marks the time during which
the bilateral agreement with the EU on the free cross-border movement of workers has been
effective. Since different types of workers are likely to be unevenly affected by recent immigration
inflows, we follow the ”structural skill-cell approach” as for example employed by Borjas (2003)
and Ottaviano and Peri (2008). This paper provides two main contributions. First, we estimate
empirically the elasticities of substitution between different types of workers in Switzerland. Our
results suggest that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes. Regarding different skill
levels, the estimates indicate that workers are imperfect substitutes across broad education groups
and across different experience groups. Second, the estimated elasticities of substitution are used
to simulate the impact on domestic wages using the actual immigration inflows from 2002 to
2008. For the long run, the simulations produce some notable distributional consequences across
different types of workers: While previous immigrants incur wage losses (−1.6%), native workers
are not negatively affected on average (+0.4%). In the short run, immigration has a negative
macroeconomic effect on the average wage, which, however, gradually dies out in the process of
capital adjustment.
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1 Introduction
In migration economics, the leading issue is concerned with the effects of immigration on the
economy of the destination country. In particular, there has been much debate among economists
and policymakers alike as to whether immigration exerts downward pressure on domestic wages or
causes unemployment. It is generally argued that the arrival of foreign workers may bring about
increased competition on the labour market among job seekers, thus worsening the position of
domestic workers by driving down wages or causing higher unemployment.
From an economic viewpoint, it is important to distinguish between macroeconomic and mi-
croeconomic effects. Regarding the former, a traditional labour market model would imply that a
sudden increase in immigrant labour lowers the amount of physical capital available per labour unit
which decreases the marginal product of labour and thus average national wages. The question
immediately arises whether physical capital responds to such a labour market shock and how fast
it will take place. A partial adjustment of physical capital will cushion the fall of the capital-labour
ratio. It is therefore clear that any macroeconomic impact of immigration depends on the dy-
namic response of physical capital accumulation. The more microeconomic aspect of the question
has received more attention by labour economics and deals with the effects of immigration on the
wages of individual workers. A traditional textbook analysis that considers a labour market with
homogenously skilled workers implies that an increase in supply leads to a new equilibrium with
lower wages. However, if labour is heterogeneous such that different types of workers are imperfect
substitutes (or even complements) for one another, an increase in the supply of one type of worker
may raise labour demand for another type of worker, and thus, their wages. In other words, some
workers might benefits from a particular influx of foreign workers, while others might lose. For ex-
ample, an increase in low-skilled immigrants can have starkly different implications for low-skilled
natives vis-à-vis high-skilled natives. As individual workers are likely to be asymmetrically affected
by immigration, one should attempt to gauge the distributional effects across different groups of
workers. Such an analysis requires a model that enables the researcher to categorize workers into
different skill groups. The interrelationships between these groups are captured by elasticities of
substitution. This form of analysis is usually referred to as the structural ”skill-cell” approach. In
employing this approach, these elasticities of substitution play a very crucial role as they govern the
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direct effects and the cross effects triggered by changes in the supply of different types of workers.
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of empirical studies using the skill-cell
approach to estimate how immigration affects wages. Previous studies often used city-level or state-
level data to exploit spatial correlations. This method, however, is prone to a number of problems
including internal native migration responses, endogeneity of immigrants’ destination, and so on
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). In contrast, the skill-cell method constitutes a ”national” ap-
proach in the sense that the country’s entire economy is considered. In terms of previous studies,
Borjas (2003) and Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) find that immigration has exerted signifi-
cant downward pressure on wages of low-skilled U.S.-born workers. In contrast, Ottaviano and Peri
(2006, 2008) report benign effects on natives’ wages but a sizable negative impact on previous im-
migrants’ wages. These rather stark differences are the result of different elasticities of substitution
used for simulation. As opposed to the formerly mentioned studies, the latter find that immigrants
and natives are imperfect substitutes despite similar skills, and in addition, less restrictive assump-
tions are imposed with respect to the substitutability between different education groups. For
Great Britain, Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2006) find that immigration flows increase
the average native-immigrant wage differential. For Germany, two recent studies obtain moderate
negative distributional effects on high-skilled natives’ wages (D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri, 2009;
Brücker and Jahn, 2008) but the total effect on native workers seems to cluster around zero. To
sum up, the above mentioned studies mostly suggest that the impact of immigration on average
wages of the total native workforce is essentially zero in the long run, but across skill groups there
may be significant differences.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we will follow the skill-cell approach in the tradition
of Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) to estimate the elasticities of substitution
between different types of workers in Switzerland. Second, these empirical estimates will then be
employed to simulate the impact on domestic wages using the actual immigration inflows from 2002
to 2008. Section 2 contains some concise facts on immigration in Switzerland. Section 3 presents an
overview of the economic literature that deals with the wage effects of immigration. In particular,
it is explained which methods are used and what results have been obtained. In Section 4, we
establish a theoretical framework based on a production function with a nested CES structure for
the labour aggregate so that workers can be differentiated according to their skill level and their
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nativity. To take into account the macroeconomic consequences of immigration, we also consider the
adjustment process of physical capital as a response to the observed foreign labour supply shocks.
Section 5 deals with the data analyzed in this paper. It contains all the relevant information
regarding the dataset and the construction of skill cells and variables. In addition, a selected
number of descriptive statistics is presented. In Section 6, estimating equations are derived from
the structural model in order to estimate empirically the elasticities of substitution between natives
and immigrants and between different skill groups. Where appropriate, the robustness of the results
is tested with respect to sample selection, fixed-effects specification and estimation method. The
results are critically evaluated and compared to the findings from other studies. Section 7 simulates
the wage effects of immigration by using the estimated values for the elasticities of substitution. In
doing so, several scenarios that differ with respect to capital adjustment are presented. Section 8
addresses some important problems and limitations that are prevalent with the approach applied
in this paper.
2 Immigration in Switzerland
In this short section, we will present some facts about immigration in Switzerland. In par-
ticular, it is shown how the nature and the magnitude of immigration into Switzerland have
changed over time. Unless otherwise indicated, the relevant data and information is drawn from
Haug and Müller-Jentsch (2008) and the latest report from the State Secretariat for Economic Af-
fairs (SECO, 2009). According to the OECD1, 24.9% of the Swiss population were born abroad
and 20.8 % do not have Swiss citizenship (in 2007). These numbers are similar to some of the
traditional immigration countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but they are much
higher than in most other European OECD countries. For example, the share of the foreign-born
population is 13% in Germany (in 2003), 8.5% in France and 10% in the United Kingdom.
From a recent historical perspective, there have been several waves of immigration into Switzer-
land. From 1950 to 1970, Switzerland’s economy experienced a period of rapid expansion with
high growth rates. There was an increasingly strong demand of domestic firms for cheap labour
that domestic labour supply could not meet. Consequently, many foreign workers, predominately
1OECD: statistics on international migration
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from Italy and to a lesser extent from Spain, were drawn into Switzerland. During these twenty
years, the number of non-Swiss residents increased from 0.3 million to roughly 1.15 million. This
large influx was largely due to domestic labour market conditions, that is, ”pull-factors”. During
the 1970s, many migrant workers had to return to their home countries as Switzerland slipped into
recession in the wake of the oil crisis in 1973. The number of foreign residents declined to less than
1 million. It was not until the second half of the 1980s that immigration started to rise again,
but there was a clear shift to other source countries: new immigrants mainly came from former
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Portugal. An important ”push-factor” for large-scale immigration from
former Yugoslavian countries was clearly the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.
Since 2000, there has been a marked shift in immigration towards EU-27/EFTA countries,
while the number of new immigrants from other countries has been declining. This development can
largely be ascribed to changes in Swiss immigration policies. Switzerland greatly eased immigration
restrictions for EU/EFTA nationals as the bilateral agreement with the EU on the free cross-border
movement of workers (Abkommen zur Personenfreizügigkeit) came into effect in 2002. In particular,
there have been a rapidly increasing number of new immigrants from Germany and Portugal. The
former group accounts for 66% and the latter group for 20% of net immigration originating from
EU/EFTA countries. Due to this shift, it appears that the nature of most recent immigration
flows better serves the needs of the domestic economy than previous flows (in the 1980s and 1990s)
because immigration is more directly linked to the labour market. In fact, growing employment in
recent years is to a considerable degree associated with the influx of foreign workers. According
to the Federal Office of Statistics (BFS)2, the number of employed persons (Erwerbsbevölkerung)
rose by 462’000 from 2000 to 2008, and 56% of this change is explained by the increase in foreign
workers. From 1990 to 1999, the stock of employed persons rose by only 218’000, while the number
of foreign workers actually declined by 6’000 (which corresponds to a negative contribution to
growth of -3%). These numbers clearly illustrate that immigrants in the 1990s had a much looser
labour market attachment compared to the more recent inflows. Furthermore, this is reflected in
the fact that new immigrants are much better educated on average. Between 1997 and 2007, around
50% of new immigrants are reported to have tertiary education, while during the 10 years before
that, this share was only half as large. Total net immigration of foreign nationals has generally
2BFS: Employment Statistics
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trended upwards since 1997 and has risen sharply in 2007 and 20083.
3 Overview of the Literature
When it comes to analyzing empirically how immigration affects domestic wages, there are two
major approaches that can be found in the literature. The first one is referred to as the ”spatial
correlations method” or sometimes as the ”area approach”, which exploits correlations between
immigrant concentrations and wages across geographic regions while controlling for a host of other
determinants of wages. The second and more recent approach is often referred to as the ”skill-cell
method”, which focuses on the national labour market and treats skill groups as heterogenous
factors of production. In this section, we will briefly present an overview as to how these two
methods have been applied in the literature.
3.1 The Spatial Correlations Method
Most studies using the spatial correlations method only find modest effects of immigration
on natives’ labour market outcomes (e.g. LaLonde and Topel (1991), Altonji and Card (1991),
De New and Zimmermann (1994) and Pischke and Velling (1997)). However, there are a number
of problems associated with this approach. First, immigration flows and wages can suffer from a
simultaneity bias. If foreign workers tend to move to places where wages are high, immigration is
endogenous to local labour market conditions. Put simply, immigration affects wages, but wages
also affect immigration. Second, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996) argue that the effects of im-
migration tend to diffuse across the boundaries of the spatial unit, i.e. the city or the state. For
instance, natives might respond to immigration by moving to other cities or by entering new occu-
pations. Such responses would naturally offset the measured impact on natives’ wages. To avoid
these difficulties, they therefore conclude that one should focus on the national labour market to
measure how immigration affects domestic labour market outcomes.
3BFS: Data on Immigration Flows
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3.2 The Skill-Cell Method
In light of the above-mentioned problems attached to the spatial correlations method, researchers
began focusing on national labour market data instead of city-level or state-level data. This ap-
proach gained momentum after the seminal work of Borjas (2003). He categorizes workers in cells
according to their education and work experience. Using national panel data, Borjas’ (2003) re-
gression results imply that a 10% increase in immigrants lowers average weekly earnings by 4%.
In contrast, if skill cells are defined by state, the impact of immigration is smaller by two thirds.
He sees this as strong evidence that the spatial approach obscures the true magnitude of the im-
migration effect. Borjas (2003) most important contribution is the specification and application of
a structural model based on a production function with a nested CES structure. This framework
explicitly captures the interrelationships between various skill cells through several elasticities of
substitution. Borjas uses his own estimates of the elasticities between different education and ex-
perience groups to calculate the wage effects. He finds that the immigration influx into the U.S.
from 1980 to 2000 reduced average wages by some 3%. Most dramatically, his simulations predict
that high school dropouts experienced wage declines of almost 9%. These numbers suggest a much
stronger adverse impact of immigration than virtually all spatial correlations studies.
However, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) point out some important limitations of Borjas (2003)
approach that they correct for in their paper. First, they lift Borjas’ restrictive assumption that
natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes. They argue that immigrants differ systematically
in their skills and preferences and therefore choose different types of jobs in the labour market.
Indeed, their empirical estimates confirm an imperfect degree of substitutability between nativity
groups. Second, Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) relax Borjas (2003) assumption of a fixed capital
stock. Instead, their model takes into account that physical capital adjusts to increases in labour
supply. Their argument is supported by long-term data on the capital-labour ratio that appears to
follow a balanced growth path. Third, they simulate the wage effects taking into account all cross-
elasticities implied by the model. In this way, changes in supply of one type of worker can also affect
labour demand of all other types of workers. In contrast, Borjas (2003) uses the partial elasticity
that only considers the changes in supply occurring in the same skill cell. As a further refinement,
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) relax the constraint that the elasticity of substitution between education
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groups must be the same for all groups. Their estimation results imply that low-educated and
highly-educated workers have much higher (possibly infinite) within-group elasticities than workers
across these broad groups. Their long-run simulations predict that immigration from 1990 to 2004
had small positive effects on natives’ wages (+0.6%) but detrimental effects on previous immigrants’
wages (-6.4%).
A number of studies focus on European labour markets. For Great Britain,
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2006) report that a 10% rise in all immigrants raises
the native-immigrant wage differential by 2.3%. Studies on Germany include Brücker and Jahn
(2008), Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008) and D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009). On
the whole, these studies find small positive effects for natives and negative effects for previous
immigrants in the long run. Allowing for wage rigidities and a more sclerotic labour market, they
report that a negative impact on unemployment induced by immigration partially offsets a decline
in wages.
From this brief overview, it has become clear that the literature provides no clear consensus
on the wage effects of immigration. For the most part, however, researchers have found rather
small adverse effects or no significant effects. However, Bodvarsson and van den Berg (2009) argue
that the current state of research still neglects important adjustment processes. Most importantly,
they stress that immigration affects the demand side of the economy. That is, new immigrants
certainly increase aggregate demand since they spend some of their earnings on locally-produced
goods and services. In this way, they will automatically boost domestic labour demand of firms
and therefore also influence wages. Empirical studies by Bodvarsson and van den Berg (2006) and
Bodvarsson, van den Berg, and Lewer (2008) find clearly positive consumer demand effects induced
by immigration that increase the average wage of local workers. Moreover, immigration may also
affect the rate of economic growth if they raise the average education level of the population (cf.
Barro, 2001).
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4 Theoretical Framework
This section will introduce a theoretical framework that constitutes the basis for the analysis. The
model is largely based on Ottaviano and Peri (2008), where workers with different education, work
experience and nativity are allowed to be imperfect substitutes. Moreover, the model builds on
a general equilibrium framework in which factor prices of labour and capital equal their marginal
products.
4.1 Production Function
We consider a neoclassical framework in which firms operate on perfectly competitive markets
and maximize profits such that all factors are paid their marginal products. As in Borjas (2003),
Ottaviano and Peri (2008), D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009), we specify the production func-
tion of the economy in the widely used Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt = AtN
α
t K
1−α
t (1)
where Yt is aggregate output, At is total factor productivity (TFP), Kt is the physical capital
stock and Nt is the CES aggregate containing all types of labour supply. The subscript t denotes
the time period. This functional form implies that α ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to the income share of
the labour aggregate and is assumed to be constant over time.4
As mentioned above, Nt represents aggregate labour supply. Since our neoclassical framework
assumes flexible wages and perfectly inelastic labour supply, labour markets clear in every period t,
so that aggregate labour demand equals aggregate labour supply. (In Section 8.2, the implications
of these assumptions will be discussed.) Nt has a nested CES structure that combines labour supply
of different education and experience groups as well as labour supply of native and foreign workers.
On the first level, it can be disaggregated as follows:
Nt = [θHtN
εHL
Ht + θLtN
εHL
Lt ]
1/εHL , (2)
4This assumption is supported by Swiss national data (see BFS: GDP by income), since the labour income share
of GDP has roughly been around 62 percent for the last 20 years and never deviated more than 2 percentage points
from this value.
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where NHt and NLt measure the labour supplied by individuals with high and low education,
respectively, in period t. The parameters θHt and θLt are the corresponding productivity parameters
that capture the relative efficiency of the labour aggregates in the production process. We constrain
them to add up to unity, i.e. θHt+θLt = 1, so that any common productivity shock will be absorbed
by TFP. The parameter εHL equals (σHL − 1)/σHL), where σHL is the elasticity of substitution
between highly-educated and less-educated labour.
In the literature, the question of how to assign workers to different education groups has been
resolved in various ways. First, workers are split in two groups of ”high” and ”low” education,
e.g. in Katz and Murphy (1992)5 and Card and Lemieux (2001). This, of course, implies that
all workers within the same group are perfect substitutes for one another. Second, some studies
(Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006) attempt to allow for a greater deal of heterogeneity by
considering 4 educational categories: some high school, high school graduates, some college, and
college graduates.
As the estimates of Ottaviano and Peri (2008) show, the degrees of substitutability among
education groups vary considerably. To allow for the possibility that workers within broad education
groups are closer substitutes than they are across broad groups, we further disaggregate NLt and
NHt into the following subgroup:
NLt = [θL1tN
εL
L1t + θL2tN
εL
L2t]
1/εL (3)
NHt = [θH1tN
εH
H1t + θH2tN
εH
H2t]
1/εH (4)
The terms Nbkt with bk ∈ {L1, L2,H1,H2} are labour aggregates for 4 education groups. The
relative productivity within the two broad groups is represented by the θ’s, where θb1t + θb2t = 1
for b ∈ {L,H}. Similarly, the parameter εb = (σb − 1)/σb captures the degree of substitutability
within group b ∈ {L,H}, with σb > 0 being the elasticity of substitution between group b1 and b2.
In the case of Switzerland, it seems to make most sense to use three educational categories
as D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009) do for Germany: group L1 are workers who have not
attained a vocational degree, group L2 have a vocational degree (Berufslehre) or completed upper
secondary education (Maturität, Berufsmaturität), and group H1 contains workers with higher
5Note: Katz and Murphy (1992) apply a weighting procedure to construct the two education groups.
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vocational training or college or university degrees. Therefore, all workers within this group are
perfect substitutes and equally productive, such that σH = ∞ and θH1t = θH2t. As a consequence,
expression (4) collapses to
NHt = θHt(NH1t + NH2t) (5)
Expression (5) implies that H1 and H2 form a homogenous group. For simplicity, it will henceforth
be referred to as H1.
As a next step, we assume that individuals with different work experience are not perfect
substitutes for one another. Put differently, a young, inexperienced individual systematically differs
in his skills and abilities compared to an old and experienced individual despite the same educational
attainment. To account for this, we disaggregate each labour composite Nbkt into experience groups:
Nbkt =


4∑
j=1
θbkjN
εX
bkjt


1/εX
(6)
where Nbkjt stands for the labour aggregate of education group bk and experience group j, with
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The parameters θbkj indicate productivity levels specific to the education-experience
groups and their sum is constrained to one, i.e.
∑4
j=1 θbkj = 1. It is important to note the relative
productivity between experience groups is assumed to remain constant over time. In other words,
we abstract away from the possibility that technology shocks might have asymmetric effects on
workers with the same education but different experience. The elasticity of substitution is given
by σX = 1/(1 − εX).
As recent evidence suggests for the United States (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, 2008), Great
Britain (Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth, 2006) and Germany (Brücker and Jahn, 2008;
Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler, 2008; D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri, 2009), there is reason to be-
lieve that native and foreign-born workers are not perfect substitutes even if they have comparable
education and experience. The reason is that immigrant workers are likely to differ systematically
with respect to certain characteristics, such as manual skills, language proficiency, and so on. This,
in turn, suggests that natives and immigrants have differentiated preferences and opportunities
in the labour market. Thus, we break down each education-experience group Nbkjt into a CES
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aggregate consisting of native and foreign labour supply:
Nbkjt =
[
θDbkjtN
εI
Dbkjt + θFbkjtN
εI
Fbkjt
]1/εI
(7)
Labour supplied by native (’domestic’) and immigrant (’foreign’) workers is denoted by NDbkjt
and NFbkjt, respectively. As previously, θDbkjt and θFbkjt measure the relative productivity of the
corresponding labour supplies and add up to one. The elasticity of substitution between native and
foreign-born labour supply is defined as σI = 1/(1 − εI).
4.2 Physical Capital Adjustment
Since markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, labour is paid its marginal product in
equilibrium. Given the production function, the average wage in the economy is given by:
wt =
∂Yt
∂Nt
= αAtκ
1−α, (8)
with κ = (Kt/Nt). The above expression suggests that a rise in the labour aggregate Nt will
cause the average wage to fall. In other words, an inflow of foreign workers will, ceteris paribus,
lead to a new labour market equilibrium with lower average wages. If we assume that the rate of
technological change At remains unaffected by immigration, we can write the (log) change of the
average wage as follows: (
∆wt
wt
)
i
= (1 − α)
(
∆κt
κt
)
(9)
If capital is perfectly inelastic to changes in labour supply, i.e. Kt = K, the change in the average
wage equals (1−α)
(
−∆FtNt
)
. However, if immigration triggers capital accumulation, the fall in the
average wage is attenuated. This follows from the fact that
∣∣∣∆κtκt
∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∆FtNt
∣∣∣ if Kt+1 > Kt = K.
What are the implications of immigration in the long run? If long-run growth is considered
exogenous as in Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1956), the economy follows a balanced growth path
in the long run. In our framework, long-run growth takes place through the increase in TFP, i.e.
At. The capital-labour ratio in steady state is then given by κ
∗
t =
(
1−α
r+δ
)1/α
A
1/α
t , where r is the
real interest rate and δ is the depreciation rate (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2008, for a more detailed
description). This implies that the capital-labour ratio, and thus the average wage, does nod
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depend on labour supply in the long-run. Hence, the long-run impact of immigration on average
wages must be equal to zero. However, the nested structure of the aggregate Nt in the model
implies that wages across labour supply groups will be asymmetrically affected if the inflows of
immigrant workers do not spread across skill groups in proportion to the size of these groups. As a
result, we can conclude that, while the long-run impact on average wages is zero due to full capital
adjustment, the model implies that immigration is likely to have permanent distributional effects
across labour supply groups.
To simulate the dynamics of capital adjustment, one needs to know how fast physical capital
will adjust to shocks in the labour market. In Section 7, we will attempt to estimate the speed of
convergence directly from Swiss data.
4.3 Wages in the Labour Market Equilibrium
In expression (8), we have already derived the average wage level if the labour market is in equilib-
rium. Expression (9) captures the macroeconomic effect on wages caused by a change in labour sup-
ply. However, since we are mainly interested in the distributional effects, we must derive the equi-
librium wage for each nativity-education-experience groups in the model. In equilibrium, the wage
of a worker with broad education b ∈ {H,L}, fine education k ∈ {1, 2}, experience j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
and nativity n ∈ {D,F} is equal to his marginal productivity. Due to the nested structure of the
CES labour aggregate, we obtain the wage by differentiating (1) with respect to Nnbkjt. If we apply
the natural logarithm and substitute in the elasticities of substitution for σHL, σb, σX and σI , the
expression can be written as
ln wnbkjt =ln(αAtκ
1−α
t ) +
1
σHL
ln Nt + ln θbt −
(
1
σHL
−
1
σb
)
ln Nbt
+ ln θbkt −
(
1
σb
−
1
σX
)
ln Nbkt + ln θbkj −
(
1
σX
−
1
σI
)
ln Nbkjt
+ ln θnbjkt −
1
σI
ln Nnbkjt
(10)
The left-hand side of (10) denotes the log of the average wage in group (n, bk, j), and the terms on
the right-hand side show how the components of the nested production function affect the wage. It
is important to note that we assume that total factor productivity At and the relative productivity
parameters, the θ’s, are not affected by any changes of labour supply. In contrast, the capital-labour
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ratio and the labour composites are directly affected by an inflow of workers with education bk and
experience j. On the one hand, there is a macroeconomic effect operating through ln
(
αAt κ
1−α
t
)
that shows how the average wage in the economy is affected by immigration. As previously pointed
out, immigration lowers the average wage if capital adjusts partially but the effect gradually dies
out in the course of the capital adjustment process. On the other hand, there are a number of
permanent distributional effects due to changes in labour supply operating through the labour
composites Nt, Nbt, Nbkt, Nbkjt, Nnbkjt. Due to the rather complex nature of the RHS in (13), we
discuss the implications of the terms one by one.
The first term 1σHL ln Nt constitutes a positive effect on the productivity of all types of workers if
aggregate labour supply increases. This is explained by the imperfect substitutability among work-
ers with different skills. The second channel of influence operates through −
(
1
σHL
− 1σb
)
ln Nbt .
It is sensible to conjecture that workers within broad education groups are closer substitutes than
across broad groups, i.e. σHL < σb. Then, an increase of labour supply in the same broad education
group negatively affects the wage. Likewise, if σb > σX holds, the third term −
(
1
σb
− 1σX
)
ln Nbkt
is positive and raises workers’ wages in the same education group bk as the immigrant inflow oc-
curs. The implications of the fourth term −
(
1
σX
− 1σI
)
lnNbkjt are somewhat more ambiguous;
the direction of the effect depends on the substitutability between experience groups relative to
the substitutability between nativity groups. If σX < σI , immigration negatively affects the wage
in education-experience group (bk, j ), but in the opposite case the effect is positive. Finally, the
term − 1σI ln Nnbkjt suggests that an increase of workers with nativity n has a negative impact on
workers’ wages in the same nativity group. This is to say, that, given native and foreign workers
are imperfect substitutes, an immigrant influx has a stronger negative effect on immigrants’ wages
than on natives’ wages even if they are located within the same education-experience group. In
other words, new immigration is more detrimental for previous immigrants if they are not perfect
substitutes for natives.
The analysis has made clear that the effect of immigration on wages works through the complex
and nested structure of the production function, where workers’ marginal productivity is not only
affected by changes in supply in the same skill cell, but also by changes in all other skill cells. What
is more, we have seen that the magnitude and the direction of the effects on wages heavily hinges
on the elasticities of substitution σHL, σb, σX and σI . Therefore, we will place a strong emphasis
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on the estimation of these elasticities in Section 6 and critically discuss the results.
5 Data
This section provides the relevant information about the datasets used for estimation. Second, it
will be explained how skill cells are constructed and how average weekly wages and labour supply
measures are computed for each cell. Finally, descriptive statistics are presented.
5.1 Dataset
To perform empirical estimation of the structural model presented in the previous section, we elicit
all the required data from the Swiss Workers Survey (Schweizerische Arbeitskräftebefragung, short:
SAKE). The data has been gathered by means of telephone interviews. The dataset provides
annual data for the time span from 1991 to 2008. The sample size varies considerably from roughly
16000 to 48000 observations, with older waves generally being smaller than more recent ones. For
our purposes, we only consider men and women aged between 18 and 64, and only those who are
currently employed, thus dropping all self-employed, unemployed and early retirees.
5.2 Construction of Skill Cells and Variables
To implement the model empirically, we need to categorize and assign workers to cells according
to nativity (“native” or “immigrant”), education and work experience. Since we have defined
3 education and 4 experience groups, we obtain 12 skill cells for natives and 12 skill cells for
immigrants per year. This subsection will explain how we allot workers to the respective cells.
First, we assign workers to cells by nativity and either categorize them as being “natives”
or “immigrants”. For this purpose, we apply a simple rule and define native workers as those
holding Swiss citizenship. Therefore, previously naturalized individuals are also categorized as
natives. In contrast, Swiss residents who only hold foreign passports are defined as immigrants.
Second, we assign all individuals to one of our 3 education groups. The crucial criterion here
is the highest degree attained at the time of data collection. The low education group (bk=L1)
includes all people who have completed mandatory schooling or dropped out before completion. In
addition, we add those who had minor job training of one or two years (Anlehre). Individuals are
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assigned to the medium education group (bk=L2) if they hold vocational degrees (Berufslehre) or
upper secondary school diplomas (Maturität, Berufsmaturität). The high education group (bk=H 1)
includes all workers with higher vocational training (höhere Fachschule, Technikerschule) and those
with college or university degrees (Fachhochschule, Universität). Third, we need to construct a
measure of potential work experience, since we do not have explicit data on how long individuals
have been active in the labour market. For this reason, we employ the following formula for each
individual i to obtain a simple measure of potential work experience:
Potential Experiencei = Agei − E [Duration ofEducationi] − 6 (11)
Since we do not know when people entered the labour market, we need to impute the duration
of education. Therefore, we use the expected (i.e. average) duration of schooling which is required
to obtain the educational degree that person i holds. It is important to note that this procedure
results in a somewhat crude measure of work experience, since employers may evaluate immigrants’
experience differently. To attenuate the impact of any potential bias, we categorize workers in only
4 but rather broad experience groups, each spanning an interval of 10 years of experience. In
contrast, most other studies use 8 experience groups and five-year intervals, e.g. Borjas (2003),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008), D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009), but they also manage to
produce more accurate measures of potential work experience. Having constructed the variable for
work experience, we drop individuals whose imputed experience is below zero or above 40 years.
Having assigned all individuals to the respective cell according to their education, experience
and nativity, the problem emerges that there are only few observations in some cells in certain
years. Especially in the data prior 2002, the cells for highly educated and highly experienced
foreign workers contain only very few observations, so that a reliable construction of average wages
and labour supply becomes problematic. To alleviate the problem, the following couples of years
are pooled together: 1991/1992, 1993/1994, 1996/1997, 1998/1999, and 2000/2001. As a result,
the “weakest” cell (bk=H 1, j=4, n=F ) contains never less than 35 observations, and the second-
to-weakest cell (bk=H 1, j=3, n=F ) contains never less than 72 observations. All other cells never
include less than 100 observations. All in all, the SAKE data from 1991 to 2008 translate into 13
waves (and thus 156 observations) available to be used for estimation.
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As a next step, we produce a measure of average weekly real wages, hours worked and employ-
ment for native and immigrant workers in each nativity-education-experience cell. For a detailed
description as to how these variables are constructed, see Section A in the Appendix.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
In this subsection, we will provide descriptive statistics of the variables described above. In par-
ticular, we focus on immigration from 2002 to 2008 since it marks the time period in which the
bilateral agreement on the free movement of people with the EU (Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen)
has been effective. The simulations in Section 7 will also consider the same time span.
Table 1 presents the percentage changes in hours worked with respect to total hours worked
for each education group over the period from 2002 to 2008. Columns 1 and 2 show how much
of the change in hours worked in a particular education group can be attributed to natives and
immigrants, respectively, so that the sum of the two corresponds to the change in total hours worked
(column 3) in that group. The numbers in column 2 are most interesting since they reflect the
cumulative changes in foreign labour supply that occurred during the period in question. It shows
clearly that immigrant inflows did not take place evenly across education group: while the increase
in hours worked due to immigration was moderate in the low education group (2.8%), the high
education group experienced a very sizable increase (13.8%). In contrast, medium-educated foreign
labour slightly declined (-0.5%) in terms of total hours worked in that group. On the whole, total
foreign labour supply increased by some 3.9% with respect to total labour supply in 2002. Column
3 indicates that there is a strong composition effect: labour supplied by highly educated individuals
rose substantially partly because aggregate labour supply has increased (6.7%) and partly because
labour supplied by the other two education groups fell in absolute terms. The former effect could
be due to growth of the labour force, less unemployment or higher average working hours. The
latter effect reflects a rising education level of the workforce.
Table 2 contains the percentage changes in average weekly real wages by nativity and education over
the same time period. In addition, it is shown how the relative size of education groups changed
with respect to hours worked. (For more detailed data on wages and hours worked across groups,
see Section B in the Appendix) It is important to note that the wage of each person is weighted by
her hours worked and corrected for inflation. While native workers within education groups earn
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Table 1: Changes Relative to Total Hours Worked in the Group from 2002 to 2008
Percentage change Percentage change Percentage change
due to native workers due to foreign workers in total hours worked
Low education -7.6% 2.8% -4.8%
Medium education -7.7% -0.5% -8.3%
High education 30.2% 13.8% 44.0%
All 2.8% 3.9% 6.7%
lower average wages in 2008, the average wage among natives roughly stayed constant (-0.2%).
This is possible because the labour supply share of the highly educated group grew substantially
(by 9.7 percentage points), while the labour supply shares of the other groups fell (by -1.6 and
-8.1 percentage points). This can be interpreted as follows: well-paid individuals within the lower
groups have moved to a higher education group by attaining higher educational degrees. Those
who newly entered the high-education group (individuals who completed higher vocational training
and college and university graduates) are paid below average compared to the rest of the group
and thus reduce the average wage in that group. Hence, the “composition effect” of labour supply
left the average wage of natives roughly constant, although average wages within education groups
declined significantly. The changes in wages among immigrant workers are much more uneven:
average wages of less educated workers declined, while average wages of highly educated workers
rose. In total, immigrant workers earned significantly higher wages (+5.5%) in 2008 compared to
2002. Again, this is to a large extent due to the composition effect of foreign labour supply. On the
one hand, some foreign individuals may have moved to a higher education group through higher
educational attainment. On the other hand, many high-skilled workers (mostly from Germany)
entered the Swiss labour market during the period, and thus raised the average wage in that group.
Moreover, since the share of low educated and low-paid workers is high among immigrants, the
relatively high-skilled influx led to a sizable increase in average wages of immigrants.
By comparing the aggregate summary statistics on labour supply and wages, we cannot draw any
conclusions about the effects of immigration on native wages. Even if correlations between foreign
labour supply and wages would be discernable, they are likely to be misleading because they fail to
uncover the true causal effect between the two variables. After all, the reasons of changes in wages
are manifold; they respond not only to labour supply shocks, but are the result of complex and
intertwined economic forces at work. They are, among other things, strongly determined by labour
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Table 2: Change in Wages and Shares of Hours Worked from 2002 to 2008
Natives Immigrants
Change in Percentage-point Change in Percentage-point
Education average weekly change in the share average weekly change in the share
group real wages of hours worked real wages of hours worked
Low -6.1% -1.6% -4.3% -2.8%
Medium -4.0% -8.1% -0.1% -7.4%
High -4.8% 9.7% 1.8% 10.2%
All -0.2% 5.5%
Notes: To calculate average weekly real wages, the wage distribution within each education group is trimmed
on both ends by one percentile.
demand which, in turn, is influenced by productivity shocks and changes in aggregate demand,
business cycle fluctuations and changes in the institutional framework of the economy. To gain a
better understanding as to how the inflows of foreign workers affect domestic wages, we must be
able to isolate the effect of immigration. In order to do this, we employ the structural model to
estimate the causal effect. Before we can proceed with these simulations, however, we must estimate
the elasticities of substitution between the various labour supply groups in the CES aggregate of
the production function.
6 Estimating the Elasticities of Substitution
6.1 Between Natives and Immigrants
The elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant labour σI has been subject to a
great deal of debate in empirical labour economics. This is because the magnitude of the pressure
on natives’ wages caused by immigration largely depends on this parameter. From the RHS in
equation (10), one can see that the scale of the ”immigration effect” is dependent on σI : the larger
the parameter, the more substitutable are native and foreign labour, and the larger is the negative
impact on natives’ wages.
On the one hand, a number of empirical studies, e.g. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997),
Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2007), a priori assume that native and immigrant labour are
homogenous factor inputs. Others do not obtain estimates of the inverse elasticity that are
significantly different from zero (e.g. Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) and Jaeger (1996)).
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On the other hand, some studies have found that the σI is indeed finite: Ottaviano and Peri
(2008) and Raphael and Smolensky (2008) for the United States, Brücker and Jahn (2008),
D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009) and Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008) for Germany, and
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2006) for Great Britain.
We estimate the elasticity of substitution σI for Switzerland by means of the constructed skill-
cell data. In order to this, we take equation (10) for native workers (n=D) and subtract the
corresponding expressions for foreign workers (n=F ) on both sides. Since all the terms without
subscript n cancel out, we are left with:
(
wFbkjt
wDbkjt
)
= ln
(
θFbkjt
θDbkjt
)
−
1
σI
ln
(
NFbkjt
NDbkjt
)
(12)
Consequently, the dependent variable is the log relative average wage in cell (bk, j ) in period t.
On the RHS, the first term captures the relative productivity of native and immigrant labour and
the second term corresponds to the log relative labour supply with a coefficient equal to the inverse
elasticity of substitution. Figure 1 plots the log relative wage against the log relative supply marked
by education groups.6 It is conspicuous that the cells are clustered by education groups; especially
the low-education group has a much higher relative supply because the share of immigrants’ hours
worked is much higher than in the other groups. It is essential to note that it would be misleading
to draw tentative conclusions from this figure regarding the elasticity of substitution; equation
(12) shows that the variation in relative wages is also explained by the relative productivity term
ln
(
θF bkjt
θDbkjt
)
that varies across education-experience groups and across time.
Now, equation (12) can be implemented empirically. To achieve this, we replace the relative
productivity term by fixed effects and add an error term to the equation:
ln
(
wFbkjt
wDbkjt
)
= dbkj + dt + djt −
1
σI
ln
(
NFbkjt
NDbkjt
)
+ ubkjt (13)
The vector dbkj contains 12 education-experience-specific dummy variables that absorb sys-
tematic differences in labour efficiency across education-experience cells. The vector dt introduces
a common time trend, and djt allows for experience-specific time trends in relative productivity.
These fixed effects take into account that the quality of immigrants’ skills across experience groups
6cell (bk = H1, j = 3, t = 1991/1992) is omitted from the sample as it appears to be a substantial outlier.
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might have changed over time (cf. Ottaviano & Peri 2008). Analogously, we can also include
education-year-specific fixed effects, but this leads to a very saturated model.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. Every entry in the table represents an estimate for
−(1/σI) from a separate regression. Every regression uses employment (E ) as analytical weights
to take into account the different sizes of the education-experience-year cells. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered around education-experience groups. The columns indicate
different fixed-effects specifications: column (1) omits experience-specific time trends, column (2)
is the specification as defined above and column (3) additionally includes education-specific time
trends, which results in a quite saturated model with somewhat larger standard errors. Row (1)
reports estimates from OLS regressions. The estimated coefficients vary across fixed-effects speci-
fications: the obtained values range from 0.05 to 0.19, though the lower bound is not significantly
different from zero. These results suggest that the elasticity of substitution lies between 5 and
20. In row (2), we apply 2SLS following the approach of Ottaviano & Peri (2008). That is, we
instrument the supply variable of hours worked (H ) by using employment (E ) as an instrumental
variable. In this way, we want to take into account that relative hours worked may be endogenous in
explaining relative wages. In fact, a simple heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test indicates that
hours worked is endogenous in the basic fixed-effects specification (the p-value is 0.037). However,
it is doubtful whether the available IV strategy manages to eliminate the potential endogeneity
problem because the correlation of hours worked and employment is very high. As a result, the
2SLS regressions produce very similar estimates as OLS. On the whole, the results of our full-
sample estimations indicate that the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants is
very likely to be smaller than infinity. For the simulation, we will choose σI = 10 as our preferred
estimate.
6.2 Between Experience Groups
In this section, we will turn to the elasticity of substitution between different experience groups,
denoted by σX in this paper. Previous studies mostly indicate that σX is well below infinity,
thus implying that individuals who differ in their work experience are imperfect substitutes in
production. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Borjas (2003) report estimates of around 3
and 3.5, respectively. Card and Lemieux (2001) do not specify experience groups, but age groups,
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Table 3: Estimation Results for −(1/σI) 1991-2008
(1) (2) (3) Observations
Fixed Effects: Fixed Effects: Fixed Effects:
Edu-Exp Edu-Exp Edu-Exp
Year Exp-Year Exp-Year
Edu-Year
OLS -0.05 -0.19** -0.14** 155
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
2SLS, Employment as IV -0.07 -0.23*** -0.16** 155
for Hours Worked (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
and conclude that the elasticity of substitution most likely lies between 4 and 6. Similarly, Ottaviano
& Peri (2008) provide estimates in the range of 6.2 and 7.7. On the other hand, Brücker & Jahn
(2008, Table 5) obtain much larger values for Germany, namely between 15 and 30 depending on
sample selection, while Felbermayr, Geis & Kohler (2008) even fail to reject the hypothesis that
−(1/σX) = 0. This brief overview of previous studies shows that there is a considerable range in
estimated values for σX .
Having estimated σI , we can now proceed to estimate the elasticity of substitution between
experience groups. First, however, we must obtain values for the productivity terms θ̂Dbkjt and
θ̂Fbkjt and second, use them to compute the labour composites N̂bkjt for each education-experience
group (bk, j ). Using equation (13), if we define D̂bkjt = d̂bkj + d̂t + d̂jt and replace the error term
with the residuals ûbkjt, it follows that
D̂bkjt =
1
σ̂I
ln
(
NFbkjt
NDbkjt
)
− ln
(
wFbkjt
wDbkjt
)
− ûbkjt (14)
As the sum of the productivity terms is constrained to one in each education-experience group,
we are able to compute them as follows:
θ̂Fbkjt =
exp(D̂bkjt)
1 + exp(D̂bkjt)
; θ̂Dbkjt =
1
1 + exp(D̂bkjt)
(15)
The parameter values obtained above and the estimated elasticity of substitution can be plugged
into equation (14) to compute a model-based measure of aggregate labour supply for each education-
experience cell: N̂bkjt =
[
θ̂DbkjtN
ε̂I
Dbkjt + θ̂FbkjtN
ε̂I
Fbkjt
]1/ε̂I
, with ε̂I = (σ̂I − 1)/σ̂I . In this way, we
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can now move up one step in the nested production function. To specify labour market equilibrium
conditions on this level of the CES aggregator, we equate the average weekly wage with the marginal
productivity of labour, i.e. wbkjt = ∂Yt/∂Nbkjt. By applying the chain rule to derive marginal
productivity and expressing everything in log-terms, we obtain:
lnwbkjt = ln
(
αA κ 1−αt
)
+
1
σ b
ln Nt + ln θbt −
(
1
σHL
−
1
σb
)
ln Nbt + ln θbkt
+
(
1
σb
−
1
σX
)
ln Nbkt + ln θbkj −
1
σX
ln Nbkjt
(16)
The log average weekly wage in cell (bk, j ) in period t is defined as ln wbkjt =
(wFbkjtNFbkjt + wDbkjtNDbkjt )/(NFbkjt + NDbkjt), a labour-supply-weighted average of native
and immigrant wages. To implement the above expression empirically, we replace all but the
last term on the RHS with fixed effects. Thus, we can write
ln wbkjt = dt + dbkt + dbkj −
1
σX
ln N̂bkjt + ubkjt (17)
The vectors dt + dbkt +dbkj represent a common time-trend, education-specific time trends and
education-experience-specific fixed effects, respectively, and capture the variation in the productiv-
ity terms, the θ′s, and the labour aggregates on the higher levels of the production function. ubkjt
is the error term in cell (bk, j ) in period t and absorbs any random disturbances.
Now, we are able to estimate σX by means of the above equation. Table 4 summarizes the
estimation results. As previously, every entry in the table constitutes an estimate for −(1/σX)
from a separate regression. Similarly, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered
around education-experience group. A cursory look at the results reveals that the estimated values
for −(1/σX) lie in a fairly narrow range from -0.08 to -0.11 with standard errors between 0.03 and
0.05. In comparing columns (1) and (2), it is clear that it does not matter whether we construct
N̂bkjt using σI = 10 or σI = ∞. The results are essentially the same. This has also been pointed
out by Brücker and Jahn (2008). Rows (1) and (2) contain OLS and 2SLS estimates, respectively.
To implement 2SLS, we instrument the supply variable hours worked in cell (bk, j ) by employment
in the same cell. Although the 2SLS method produces higher estimates than OLS, the differences
are rather small. All in all, the results imply that the elasticity of substitution between different
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experience groups lies somewhere between 9 and 12.5. The preferred estimate is defined as σX = 10.
This value is somewhat larger than what most U.S. studies have found but lower than those obtained
for Germany. It is therefore safe to say that the obtained results seem plausible.
Table 4: Estimation Results for −(1/σX), 1991-2008
(1) (2)
σI = 10 σI = ∞
OLS -0.09** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.03)
2SLS, Employment as IV -0.10*** -0.10***
for Hours Worked (0.03) (0.03)
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Observations: 155
6.3 Between Education Groups
When it comes to the elasticity of substitution between education groups, it is crucial to consider
how these groups are categorized. Katz and Murphy (1992) analyse 4 groups: high-school dropouts
(HSD), high-school graduates (HSG), some college (SCO) and college graduates (COG), but they
apply a weighting procedure to express all workers in terms of HSG equivalents and COG equiva-
lents. The elasticity of substitution between these two groups is then found to be 1.4. Card and
Lemieux (2001) proceed in a similar way with two broad education groups and obtain estimates
between 2 and 2.5, though they use a sample of men only. Borjas (2003), Ottaviano & Peri (2006)
and Borjas & Katz (2007) specify their structural model with 4 education groups, but constrain
the elasticities of substitution between them to be equal, i.e. σHL = σH = σL. This restriction is
necessary as there would not be enough degrees of freedom to identify the individual parameters
otherwise. However, this restriction is not in line with intuition, since one would expect workers
within broad education groups to be closer substitutes than workers across broad groups. In other
words, a high school dropout is expected to be more “similar” to a high-school graduate than to
a college graduate with respect to his skill composition, hence σL > σHL. This argument is also
backed up by empirical evidence by Ottaviano & Peri (2008). For this reason, we attempt to esti-
mate these parameters separately by following the approach of Katz & Murphy (1992) as also do
Ottaviano & Peri (2008).
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6.3.1 Between Broad Education Groups
To estimate σHL, we can derive the estimation equation of Katz & Murphy (1992) from the the-
oretical model. First, using the equilibrium condition that the average wage equals the marginal
product of labour in each broad education group b, wbt = ∂Yt/∂Nbt, we can write:
ln wbt = ln
(
αAκ1−αt
)
+
1
σHL
ln Nt + ln θbt −
1
σHL
ln Nbt (18)
Second, taking the difference between b=H and b=L on both sides reduces the above equation
to:
ln
(
wHt
wLt
)
= ln
(
θHt
θLt
)
−
1
σHL
ln
(
NHt
NLt
)
(19)
where ln (wHt/wLt) measures the wage gap between highly-educated and less-educated workers,
ln (θHt/θLt) captures the relative efficiency of these workers, and ln (NHt/NLt) measures relative
supply in terms of hours worked. Empirical implementation can be achieved by
ln
(
wHkt
wLkt
)
= dt −
1
σHL
ln
(
NHt
NLt
)
+ ut (20)
where the vector dt contains time-specific fixed effects that absorb changes in the relative ef-
ficiency term ln (θHt/θLt) and ut captures random disturbances in year t. The problem arises
that we do not have enough observations to include t-1 fixed-effects dummy variables. Even if the
constant were dropped, the model remains completely saturated with no degrees of freedom left
to identify σHL. Katz & Murphy (1992) and Ottaviano & Peri (2008) circumvent this problem by
assuming that dt follows a linear time trend. To see whether this is a reasonable assumption for
the sample used in this paper, Figure 2 plots the dependent variable ln (wHt/wLt) and the relative
supply ln (NHt/NLt) against time.
The evolution of the wage gap illustrates that this assumption does not fit the data: the trend
is clearly non-linear. Figure 2 shows that the wages of highly-educated workers increased sharply
in the second half of the 1990s relative to the wages of less-educated workers. Contemporaneously,
relative labour supply fell or grew only modestly. This period is therefore characterized by a higher
level of relative scarcity of highly-educated labour. To better fit the model to the data, we include
dummy variables for period 2 (1997-2002) and period 3 (2003-2008), respectively, to modify the
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intercept and the slope of the time trend. These period-specific intercepts and slope coefficients
are meant to capture the non-linearities in the time trend.
The results for −(1/σHL) are set out in Table 5. Every entry in the table represents an estimate
from a separate regression. The estimation method is OLS using aggregate employment as ana-
lytical weights. Standard errors are Newey-West autocorrelation-robust, since the error term may
be serially correlated. Column (1) reports the estimation results from the model where the time
trend has period-specific intercepts and slopes. In column (2), the model contains only a linear
time trend, analogous to Katz and Murphy (1992) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008). In comparing
the results for −(1/σHL), two observations are worth commenting on. First, the model using a
linear time trend produces much lower estimates with larger standard errors than in column (1),
despite a higher number of degrees of freedom. Second, the choice of the supply variable, that is,
whether hours worked or employment is used, has no significant impact on the results. In terms of
the elasticity of substitution, column (1) implies a value of around 3.7 to 4, and column (2) implies
a value of 8.3 to 9. Since we consider the period-specific time trend to be more appropriate, the
lower range is probably more plausible. It is worth recalling that these values are still somewhat
higher than what has been found by previous studies mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Before we conclude, it is tested for whether the model in column (1) is well-specified. A series
of F-tests for the slope and intercept dummies confirm that the time trend exhibits structural
breaks and is significantly non-linear. We can therefore conclude that values between 3.7 and 4
provide a reasonable range for σHL. In light of the results of previous studies, we choose the lower
bound of 3.7 as the preferred estimate for the elasticity of substitution between highly-educated
and less-educated workers.
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Table 5: Estimation Results for −(1/σHL), 1991-2008
(1) (2)
Period-specific Linear
time trend time trend
Supply variable: -0.27*** -0.11
Hours worked (0.05) (0.07)
Supply variable: -0.25*** -0.12*
Employment (0.03) (0.06)
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Observations: 18
6.3.2 Between Education Subgroups
As pointed out in the beginning of this section, Ottaviano & Peri (2008) provide evidence that
the restriction σHL = σH = σL of Borjas (2003) is overwhelmingly rejected by the data. Applying
the Katz & Murphy (1992) method, their findings suggest that σHL is between 1.5 and 2, whereas
the point estimates for the within-group elasticities σH and σL are much larger (Table 6 in OP
2008), so that the null hypotheses −(1/σH) = 0 and −(1/σL) = 0 mostly cannot be rejected at a
reasonable level of significance. Overall, their results imply that σHL < σH < σL. Relaxing the
rather stringent equality restriction has revealed that the elasticities substantially differ in size.
Therefore, we attempt to estimate σH and σL individually by proceeding in the same fashion as
before.
To derive estimating equations from the structural model, we differentiate the production
function with respect to Nbkt and equate it to the wage of workers in cell (bk) in period t, i.e.
wbkt = ∂Yt/∂Nbkt, since this must hold in equilibrium. Using the chain rule and applying the
natural logarithm, the equation reads:
ln wbkt = ln
(
αAκ1−αt
)
+
1
σHL
ln Nt + ln θbt −
(
1
σHL
−
1
σb
)
ln Nbt + ln θbkt +
(
1
σb
)
ln Nbkt (21)
If we take the difference between subgroup k=2 and subgroup k=1 within broad group b, we
are left with:
ln
(
wb2t
wb1t
)
= ln
(
θb2t
θb1t
)
+
(
1
σb
)
ln
(
Nb2t
Nb1t
)
(22)
This expression enables us to implement it empirically by simply replacing the relative efficiency
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term ln (θb2t/θb1t) with a time trend and by adding a random disturbance for group b in period t :
ln
(
wb2t
wb1t
)
= dbt+
(
1
σb
)
ln
(
Nb2t
Nb1t
)
+ ubt (23)
First, we turn to the low-education group. Figure 3 plots the dependent variable ln (wL2t/wL1t)
and the supply variable ln (NL2t/NL1t) against time. Since the wage gap between education groups
L2 and L1 does not seem to follow a particular trend, we therefore consider a time series model
with no time trend. Figure 4 plots the same variables for b=H. Broadly speaking, the relative
wage declines at the beginning of the time period and reaches a trough in 1999. After 1999, the
trend is generally positive, but there are large fluctuations. To fit a time series model, we use a
period-specific time trend in that we include dummy variables that allow for a different slope and
intercept in the period from 1999 to 2008.
The estimation results for −(1/σL) and −(1/σH) are summarized in Table 6. The estimation
method is OLS using employment as analytical weights and standard errors are Newey-West au-
tocorrelation robust. The results for − (1/σL) in column (1) are essentially zero, which implies
that σL = ∞. That is to say, workers within the low-education group are estimated as being
perfect substitutes. In other words, those with vocational training and those without vocational
training supply homogenous labour. This result is rather surprising, since one would expect that
vocational degrees differentiate workers from those who have not attained the same educational
level. However, the data does not provide support for this line of reasoning.
In Section 4, we argued that workers within the high-education group are perfect substitutes
for each other, such that σH = ∞. Now, we want to test for this assumption by estimating the
elasticity of substitution for the two subgroups H1 and H2. The results in Table 6 in column
(2) suggest that the point estimates of −(1/σH) lie around −0.05, but not significantly different
from zero at the 10%-level. To test whether the modification of the time trend is justified, we test
the significance of the period-specific intercept through H0 : c1999−2008 = 0 and the period-specific
slope coefficient through H0 : δ1999−2008 = 0. The corresponding t-tests yield p-values of 0.03 and
thus reject the null hypotheses at the 5%-level, which leads us to conclude that the post-1999 time
trend is significantly different from the pre-1999 time trend.
Our estimation results are consistent with the empirical evidence of other studies (cf.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for −(1/σb), 1991-2008
−(1/σL) −(1/σH)
Supply variable: 0.04 -0.04
Hours worked (0.04) (0.05)
Supply variable: 0.04 -0.05
Employment (0.06) (0.06)
Time trend no period-specific
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Observations: 18
Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). First, workers with high and low education are imperfect substitutes
given an elasticity of 3.7. Second, workers within those groups are found to be perfect substitutes.
This implies that those with and without vocational education constitute a homogenous labour
supply group.
7 Simulating the Effects of Immigration from 2002 to 2008
This section will now make use of the estimated elasticities of substitution to analyze the impact on
wages in Switzerland caused by immigration inflows from 2002 to 2008. As mentioned previously,
this time period is deliberately chosen because it marks the period during which the bilateral
agreement with the EU on the free movement of workers across borders has been effective. As
described in Section 2, both the magnitude of total immigration flows and the fraction of those
with high education have increased significantly.
As a first step, an equation must be derived from the model that allows us to simulate the
percentage changes in the average wage of each skill and nativity group due to the above mentioned
sequence of immigration flows. Using equation (10), we can take the difference between period t+p
and t for all expressions on both sides. Since TFP and relative productivity levels are assumed to
be unaffected by immigration, the causal effect on the average wage of any group (n, bk, j ) is given
by
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(24)
where sbt, sbkt, sbkjt and sFbkjt are the shares of the total wage bill paid to the respective groups
and IF is an indicator for immigrant workers, i.e. IF = {1 | n = F} and equals zero for native
workers. For a step-by-step description as to how the above equation is derived, see Section C
in the Appendix. In addition, Section D in the Appendix explains how the wage effects can be
aggregated up to the higher levels of the nested CES structure.
As a next step, it is no possible to simulate the effects on wages induced by the increase in foreign
labour supply from 2002 to 2008. Equation (24) provides the basic instrument for the calculations,
but we also aggregate up the results to obtain the average effects on individual education groups (by
using (36)), on natives and immigrants (by using (37)) and on the average national wage (by using
((38)). For all simulations, we use the preferred values for the elasticities of substitution obtained
from estimation. To be consistent with the original specification of skill groups, the simulation of
the distributional effects will be conducted using 3 education groups because this represents the
most appropriate categorization for Switzerland. Thus, we set σI = 10, σX = 10, σHL = 3.7,
σL = 1000 (which implies perfect substitution).
7.1 Long-Run Effects with Full Capital Adjustment
First, we focus on the long-run implications of immigration which entails complete convergence
to the steady-state growth path, and thus, full capital adjustment. In other words, the term
(1 − α)
(
△κt
κt
)
i
in equation (24) is zero, so that we can concentrate on the purely distributional
effects and disregard for a moment the macroeconomic effects occurring in the short and medium
run. The simulation results are reported in column (1) of Table 7. It is very important to note that
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all numbers in Table 7 show how the increase in foreign labour supply from 2002 to 2008 affects
wages in comparison to the situation in which foreign labour supply remains constant during the
same period. Plainly stated, the numbers represent the causal effects of immigration on wages and
not the actual change in wages over the period.
Turning to the effects on natives’ wages first, the results imply that immigration flows from 2002
to 2008 have fairly moderate distributional effects in the long run. While the impact on workers
with low and medium education is positive (1.5% and 1.3%), the high education group incurs
a small wage loss (−0.9%) due to immigration. Overall, the increase in foreign labour supply
raises the average wage of native workers by 0.4% in steady state. So there is in fact a small but
positive effect on natives’ wages in the long run. Turning to the long-run effects on immigrants,
we see that the distributional effects across education groups roughly follow the same pattern but
their magnitude is larger. This has of course to do with the fact that natives and immigrants
are found to be imperfect substitutes for one another. As a most salient result, the steady-state
wages of highly-educated foreign workers are 7.4% lower due to immigration. In contrast, low-
educated and medium-educated foreign workers experience wage gains of 1.1% and 1.5% in steady
state, respectively. All in all, the immigrant influx from 2002 to 2008 causes the average wage of
immigrants to fall by 1.6% in steady state.
An important question is how sensitive the results are with respect to the elasticities of sub-
stitution. Table 8 illustrates how the average long-run effects on natives and previous immigrants
change if one standard error is added or subtracted from the inverse values of σI , σHL or σX while
leaving all other parameters unchanged. Two results emerge from the numbers in the table. First,
σHL and σX only exert a negligibly small influence on the aggregate outcomes of nativity groups,
despite having distributional consequences within nativity groups (which are not shown in Table
8). Second and not surprisingly, σI strongly affects average native and immigrant wages: the larger
σI is, the more shifts the adverse impact from previous immigrants to natives. However, even as
σI approaches infinity, native workers’ wages are barely negatively affected on average. In other
words, immigration does not lower average native wages in the long run, even if the elasticity of
substitution between natives and immigrants is infinite. This finding can be directly compared
to Ottaviano and Peri (2007, Table 7) who report average long-run wage effects for natives and
immigrants of 0.1% and −0.9%, respectively, when imposing σI = ∞. Borjas and Katz (2007)
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Table 7: Effects on Wages in Switzerland due to Immigration from 2002 to 2008
Long-Run effects: Short-run effects: Short-run effects: Medium-Run effects:
Full capital Fixed capital Capital adjustment Capital adjustment
adjustment (counterfactual) (2008) (2012)
Percentage change impact on natives
Low education 1.5% 0.1% 0.5% 1.0%
Medium education 1.3% -0.2% 0.3% 0.7%
High education -0.9% -2.4% -1.9% -1.4%
Weighted average 0.4% -1.0% -0.5% -0.1%
Change in hours worked
by immigrants relative
Percentage change impact on previous immigrants to total hours worked
Low education 1.1% -0.4% 0.1% 0.6% 2.8%
Medium education 1.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% -0.5%
High education -7.4% -8.9% -8.4% -8.0% 13.8%
Weighted average -1.6% -3.0% -2.6% -2.1% 3.9%
Weighted total 0.0% -1.5% -1.0% -0.5%
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do not report these outcomes for nativity groups separately, but Ottaviano and Peri (2008, Table
8, Column 10) provide these estimates using Borjas & Katz’ parameters: aggregate outcomes are
essentially the same as in Ottaviano and Peri (2007). Put simply, these numbers are of opposite
sign because skill groups are affected differently in the U.S. and because these skill groups have
different wage shares than in Switzerland. It is worth recalling that the effects across education-
experience cells are exactly the same for natives and immigrants if σI = ∞. But since the wage
share of each group (n, bk, j ) is used as a weight to aggregate up the effects (see equation (37)),
the average effects for natives and immigrants are different from one another. From the numbers
in Table 8, it then follows that Swiss workers incur a slight wage loss (given σI = ∞) because
highly educated workers, who are negatively impacted, earn a higher wage share among natives
than among immigrants. Moreover, one can point out that the numbers in this paper are generally
smaller compared to the aforementioned U.S. studies because their simulations take into account a
much longer time period.
Table 8: Sensitivity of Long-Run Wage Effects with Respect to the Elasticities of Substitution
modified value for the average effect average effect
elasticity of substitution on natives on previous immigrants
basic estimates 0.45% -1.57%
σI low 6.66 0.70% -2.44%
high 20 0.21% -0.73%
”infinite” 1000000 -0.03% 0.11%
σHL low 3 0.44% -1.54%
high 4.8 0.46% -1.60%
σX low 7.7 0.45% -1.58%
high 14 0.45% -1.56%
Notes: low/high elasticity values are calculated by adding/subtracting the average standard error to/from
the basic inverse elasticity of substitution. For σI , the inverse is 0.1 and the average standard error is 0.05.
For σHL, the inverse is 0.27 and the average standard error is 0.06. For σX , the inverse is 0.1 and the average
standard error is 0.03.
To sum up the results from the long-run simulation, three important results are obtained.
First, natives are on average not negatively affected in the long run as opposed to immigrants,
who have lower steady-state wages. This stems from imperfect substitutability between the two
groups. Second, the uneven patterns of immigrant inflows across education groups are reflected
in the distributional effects on wages. Highly educated workers are exposed to more competition
on the labour market due to larger inflows of immigrants with the same skill level. And third,
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the elasticities of substitution between education groups that are used in the simulation play a
very crucial role in determining the distribution of wage effects. On one hand, low substitutability
between broad education groups leads to positive cross-effects. That is to say, less educated workers
can benefit from large increases in highly educated foreign labour. On the other hand, the effects
of immigration can easily spill over across education subgroups within the same broad group as
consequence of large within-group elasticities. Hence, low-educated workers benefit from the fall in
supply of medium-educated immigrants.
7.2 Short-run Effects with Fixed Capital
The traditional way of analyzing the impact of labour supply shocks on wages is to focus on
the labour market equilibrium and assume that the capital stock is perfectly inelastic (as in
Borjas (2003, Table 9) and Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2006, Table 8)). Given the
immigration inflows over the period from 2002 to 2008, the effect on the average wage equals
(1−α)
(
−△F2002−2008
N2002
)
which amounts to 0.38 ∗ (−3.9%) = −1.5%. As one can see in column (2)
in Table 7, all numbers are scaled down by this constant when compared to the long-run effects in
column (1). Put differently, this macroeconomic wage effect caused by the decline in the capital-
labour ratio affects all workers to the same extent and leaves the relative wage effects across groups
unchanged. It is crucial to note that this scenario is rather unrealistic as it assumes no response of
capital over the entire period considered. In the section below, this assumption will be dropped.
7.3 Short-Run and Medium-Run Effects with Capital Adjustment
To simulate the dynamics of capital adjustment, we need to specify how fast the economy converges
back to steady state. Empirical growth literature provides several estimates of the so-called ”speed
of adjustment” with which the economy converges to steady state. Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort
(1996) and Islam (1995) estimate the speed of convergence as being roughly 10 percent per annum.
In a more recent study, McQuinn and Whelan (2007) provide an average estimate of around 7 per-
cent.7 To simulate the adjustment of the capital-labour ratio, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) normalize
7For a detailed overview of the convergence literature, see Islam (2003).
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the balanced growth path to zero and use the following first-order difference equation:
ln κt = 0.9 ln κt−1 − 0.9
(
∆Ft
Nt
)
(25)
They use an adjustment parameter of 0.9 (equivalent to a speed of convergence of 10%) and set the
impact parameter of the labour supply shock equal to −0.9 which implies that capital adjustment
begins in the same period as the labour supply shock occurs.
To simulate the dynamics for Switzerland, we attempt to estimate the speed-of-convergence
parameter directly from Swiss data. In order to do this, we use the estimating equation of
Ottaviano and Peri (2008, equation (24)):
ln (κt) = β0 + β1ln (κt−1) + β2(trend) + γ
△Ft
Nt
+ ut (26)
The capital-labour ratio is constructed using annual data from 1991 to 2007 available from the
BFS: the physical capital stock8 at constant prices is divided by the total actual hours worked drawn
from the AVOL9 (Arbeitsvolumenstatistik). The AVOL data is used because it provides a more
comprehensive measure of hours worked than the SAKE data. The time trend is approximated by
a deterministic linear trend. As for the labour supply shock, we test two specifications: the change
in labour supply relative to total labour supply
(
△Nt
Nt
)
, and the change in labour supply due to
foreign workers only
(
△Ft
Nt
)
. As Ottaviano and Peri (2008), we attempt to correct for potential
endogeneity by instrumenting these variables with the percentage change in the population. The
estimation results for β1 are summarized in Table 9. At first glance, all point estimates yield
plausible values for β1. The speed of convergence defined as (1−β1) is estimated between 0.08 and
0.15. Unfortunately, only once out of four times can the null hypothesis of β1 equal to one be
rejected at a reasonable significance level. Otherwise, standard errors are too large and render the
estimates insignificantly different from one.
Two critical comments are necessary. First, the data only covers a short period. Since we are
interested in the long-run behaviour of the capital-labour ratio, a solid estimation would require
much longer time series data. Second, the problem of biasedness due to serial correlation is in-
8BFS: Physical Capital Stock
9BFS: AVOL (labour volume statistics)
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Table 9: Estimation Results for β1, 1991-2007
Labour supply shock: Labour supply shock:(
△Nt
Nt
) (
△Ft
Nt
)
OLS 0.92 0.91
(0.13) (0.10)
2SLS 0.85** 0.87
(0.05) (0.27)
Significance levels for H0 = 1: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Observations: 16
Notes: 2SLS uses the percentage change in the population as IV for the labour supply
shock. All standard errors are Newey-West autocorrelation-robust.
herent, since the lagged dependent variable enters as a regressor. The ACFs of the residual series
reveal significantly autocorrelated residuals. Therefore, it must be borne in mind that the results
obtained have to be treated with a great deal of caution. However, since the estimated values
are roughly consistent with the findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and other empirical growth
studies mentioned earlier, we define β1 = 0.9, and simulate the dynamics of the capital-labour
ratio as specified in equation (25) and exactly as do Ottaviano and Peri (2008). Figure 5 plots
the simulation results against time. It is readily discernable that the labour supply shocks greatly
increased in magnitude as of 2003.
Given the simulated series in Figure 5, it is now possible to calculate the macroeconomic effect
of the increase in foreign labour supply from 2002 to 2008. As of 2008, the decline in the capital-
labour ratio is equal to ln (κ2008) − ln (κ2002) = −2.6%. Using equation (9), this amounts to an
effect of −1.0% (= 0.38∗ (−2.6%) ) on average real wages in Switzerland. Note that this corresponds
exactly to the value in the very last row of column (3) in Table 7. In the medium term (in 2012),
the the capital-labour ratio is only 1.4% lower than in 2002, which translates into a mere −0.5%
effect on the average wage. Again, this is the number found in the last row of column (4) in Table
7. Since we are only interested in the causal effect of immigration from 2002 to 2008, it is assumed
that labour supply remains constant after 2008. This can readily be seen in Figure 5, since ln (κt)
begins to rise monotonically as of 2008. In sum, the simulated dynamics of the capital-labour ratio
show that, as of 2008, 33% of the distance to the long-run impact is eliminated, and 66% as of
2012.
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8 Critical Issues and Limitations
This section will critically evaluate and discuss the approach and the methods employed by this
paper. In doing so, we will point out some crucial problems and limitations and discuss their
implications for the results. First, we will deal with the problem of endogeneity which is relevant
in the simulation of the wage effects as well as in the estimation of the elasticities of substitution.
Second, two underlying assumptions of the theoretical framework will be critically discussed: the
properties of flexible wages and perfectly inelastic labour supply.
8.1 The Endogeneity Problem
The most important problem with respect to the analysis conducted in this paper is that of endo-
geneity. As hinted at above, the problem is twofold: first, potential endogeneity biases the simula-
tion of the wage effects of immigration, and second, it obstructs the estimation of the elasticities
of substitution. As for the first aspect, the problem arises because the model used for simulation
treats the influx of foreign labour as unanticipated, exogenous shocks, meaning that the nature
and magnitude of immigrant inflows are entirely determined outside the theoretical framework.
This is consistent with the argument that immigration is largely conditioned by “push” factors;
the decision to leave the sending country and to move to a particular destination country is, for
instance, independent of labour demand in the destination country. It is more likely, however, that
immigration flows are indeed influenced by economic conditions in the destination country such as
labour demand, i.e. by “pull” factors. For instance, if there is a shortage of skilled workers and
labour markets are open, this is likely to attract foreign workers with the qualifications required to
serve the needs of domestic firms. Such inflows would then be regarded as endogenous because it is
determined by the conditions within the domestic economy. In such a case, there need not be any
detrimental effect on wages of natives and settled immigrants, since foreign workers merely fill in
job gaps and do not bring about an increased level of competition in the labour market. Treating
the increase in foreign labour supply as purely exogenous is therefore not innocuous as it tends to
overestimates the negative impact on wages.
Second, estimating the elasticities of substitution is also inherently prone to the endogeneity
problem. This stems from the fact that labour supply (usually hours worked) is used to explain
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weekly wages in the regression equations. It is reasonable to conjecture, however, that weekly
wages also have some bearing on labour supply such that both variables may be simultaneously
determined. For example, if immigration rates in a particular skill group are high because of rising
wages in that group, the measured impact on the relative wage will be smaller compared to the
case where immigration is purely exogenous. Since the inverse elasticity of substitution is identified
by the variation in relative wages and relative labour supply, estimates will be biased towards zero.
This results in an upward bias in the elasticities of substitution, and thus larger adverse spill-over
effects across nativity and skill groups. In this paper, it has been attempted to resolve this problem
by employing available instrumental variables for labour supply, e.g. employment or population,
but the validity of these instruments must be questioned.
8.2 Limitations of the Theoretical Framework
An aspect that needs mentioning concerns the underlying assumptions of the structural model.
The most important limitation concerns the assumption of flexible wages. In this paper, the
theoretical framework is based on a neoclassical production function with perfect competition and
labour market clearing in all periods. The latter property entails that there are no frictions in the
labour market such that wages adjust to their equilibrium level in every period and no involuntary
unemployment prevails. Given the ample evidence of downward rigidities of nominal wages, this
assumption is clearly restrictive. First, due to fairness, firms may abstain from lowering wages
and cut costs by shrinking the workforce instead (cf. Akerlof 1982). Second, collective labour
agreements pin down the wages of workers for a certain amount of time. In Switzerland, 1.68 million
employees, roughly 50% of all employees (excluding apprentices), are covered by such agreements
(Gesamtarbeitsverträge).10 As a result, employers are unwilling or unable to lower wages when
marginal productivity drops due to immigration shocks and may lay off workers instead. In other
words, wages are probably not flexible in responding to changes in labour supply. Instead of
driving wages all the way to the new market-clearing equilibrium, immigration shocks may have
repercussions on unemployment. If this is the case, wage rigidities incorporated in the model would
lead to a smaller impact on wages at the expense of a transitory increase in unemployment.
10BFS: Data on Collective Labour Agreements
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9 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to investigate how recent immigration inflows have affected wages
of native and foreign-born workers in Switzerland. The analysis was conducted using the structural
“skill-cell approach” as employed by Borjas (2003); Borjas and Katz (2007); Ottaviano and Peri
(2006, 2008). The first important contribution of this paper was to estimate the elasticities of
substitution between different types of workers for Switzerland. Regarding natives and immigrants,
our results suggest that they are in fact imperfect substitutes, which is in line with the results of
Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008); Brücker and Jahn (2008); Felbermayr, Geis, and Kohler (2008);
D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009); Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2006). This implies
that a rise in foreign labour supply exerts stronger pressure on wages of already settled immigrants
than on those of native workers. Regarding different skill levels, the estimates indicate that workers
are imperfect substitutes across broad education groups and across different experience groups. In
contrast, education subgroups within broad groups are found to have much larger, possibly infinite,
elasticities. On the whole, this paper produces a set of parameter values that seems plausible and
is largely consistent with the findings of a fair number of other studies.
The second important contribution of this paper was to simulate the impact of immigration
on wages using the actual increases of foreign labour supply from 2002 to 2008. For the long run,
the simulations produce some notable distributional consequences across different types of workers:
While previous immigrants incur wage losses, native workers are not negatively affected on average.
It is interesting to note that this holds true even if the elasticity of substitution between nativity
groups approaches infinity. Across education groups, highly-educated workers clearly receive the
largest amount of competition from new immigrants and therefore face the strongest downward
pressure on their wages. For the short run, the simulations predict a negative impact of immigration
on the macroeconomic level, meaning that all labour supply groups are equally affected. Taking
into account the dynamic response of physical capital, however, the effect is predicted to die out in
the course of the adjustment process.
While the simulations certainly provide an idea as to how immigration affects domestic wages,
there are a number of critical aspects associated with the approach chosen in this paper. First, it
cannot be ruled out that the simulation results suffer from an endogeneity bias given that the model
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treats the increases in foreign labour supply as exogenous shocks. If such a bias is present, the
true impact on wages is smaller than predicted. Second, the theoretical framework has some clear
limitations: it assumes labour-market clearing and flexible wages such that immigration cannot
induce unemployment amongst natives and/or previous immigrants. If this assumption does not
hold in reality, the actual wage effects would again be smaller than predicted by the simulations.
Furthermore, labour supply choices of workers are assumed to be completely inelastic to immigrant
inflows. Although this represents another potential source of distortion, the direction of this type
of bias remains obscure. In sum, the numbers produced by the simulations probably represent an
“upper bound”; the true impact of immigration on wages is therefore likely to be smaller than
predicted in this paper.
With regard to immigration policy, it is important to gain a better understanding as to how
domestic labour markets are affected by an increasing number of foreign workers. Since there is an
ongoing debate about these issues among economists and policymakers, we believe that this study
helps to contribute to the discussion and that it may even instigate further research in the field.
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Figure 1: Education-Experience-Year Groups, 1991 - 2008
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Figure 2: Relative Wage and Relative Supply (High and Low Education)
−
.5
−
.4
−
.3
−
.2
−
.1
0
ln
(h
o
u
rs
 H
/h
o
u
rs
 L
)
.3
.3
2
.3
4
.3
6
.3
8
.4
ln
(w
a
g
e
 H
/w
a
g
e
 L
)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
ln(wage H/wage L) ln(hours H/hours L)
44
Figure 3: Relative Wage and Relative Supply of Education Subgroups L2 and L1
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Figure 4: Relative Wage and Relative Supply of Education Subgroups H2 and H1
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Figure 5: Simulation of the log Capital-Labour-Ratio
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Appendix
A Construction of Variables: Wages, Hours Worked and Employment
We construct the average weekly wage w for each cell as follows:
w =
∑N
i=1 wi ∗ ωi ∗ Hi∑N
i=1 ωi ∗ Hi
(27)
The weekly wage wi of person i is obtained by dividing reported annual labour income by
52. This method has a clear weakness because we unconditionally assume that everybody in the
sample was employed all year. We are bound to make this assumption as we do not have data on
the number of weeks worked per annum. The term ωi denotes the person’s weight in the sample as
calculated by the Federal Office of Statistics (BFS) and is a measure of “representativeness” with
respect to the Swiss population above the age of 15. Hi denotes the weekly hours worked of person
i and is reset to zero if negative and reset to 60 if this threshold is exceeded. With the number of
individuals in the cell being N , the enumerator corresponds to the total wage bill of the cell scaled
by hours worked, so that w is the hours-weighted average weekly wage in the labour supply cell.
In this way, part-time workers are assigned less weight than full-time workers in the calculation of
the average wage. This is an advantageous feature because Hi might be correlated with wi, such
that the fraction of part-time workers in a cell influences the average wage. Scaling wages by hours
at least partially corrects for this distortion. Since wages are reported in nominal terms, they need
to be adjusted for inflation. We use the Swiss Consumer Price Index11 published by the BFS to
express all wages in terms of 2005 Swiss francs.
As a next step, we construct labour supply measures. Compared to the wage sample, we use a
more comprehensive dataset in that we include all those individuals who do not report wage income
but state the number of hours worked per week. This makes sense because some interviewees may
refuse to report wage income because of privacy concerns. In contrast, they are unlikely to have
the same considerations when it comes to hours worked. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use this
broader sample for the construction of labour supply. For each nativity-education-experience cell,
we compute a measure for total hours worked (H ) as
11BFS: Consumer Price Index
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H =
1
40
N∑
i=1
ωi ∗ H i (28)
We simply sum up weighted hours worked across all individuals N in each cell and scale it down
by a factor of 40 so that the measure roughly corresponds to the number of full-time-equivalent
workers. In addition, we produce an alternative measure of labour supply which is insensitive to
hours worked, as hours worked might be endogenous in explaining wage differentials. For this
purpose, we compute a simple measure of employment (E ) for each cell as follows:
E =
N∑
i=1
ωi (29)
This variable is simply the sum of all personal weights in each cell and corresponds to the size
of the labour force (without the self-employed) in each nativity-education-experience group.
B Descriptive Statistics: Wages and Hours Worked
Table 10 below contains additional descriptive statistics pertaining to the numbers in Table 2. It
sets out average weekly real wages and shares of hours worked across education groups. To obtain
the numbers in Table 2, one must simply calculate the difference between 2002 and 2008.
Table 10: Average Weekly Real Wages and Shares of Hours Worked
Natives
Average weekly real wages shares of hours worked
2002 2008 2002 2008
Low education 1024 962 7.9% 6.3%
Medium education 1342 1288 63.0% 55.0%
High education 1990 1895 29.1% 38.8%
Average/total 1506 1503 100.0% 100.0%
Immigrants
Average weekly real wages shares of hours worked
2002 2008 2002 2008
Low education 1036 991 30.6% 27.8%
Medium education 1197 1196 46.2% 38.9%
High education 1879 1913 23.1% 33.3%
Average/total 1306 1378 100.0% 100.0%
Notes: To calculate average weekly real wages, the wage distribution within each education
group is trimmed on both ends by one percentile.
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C Construction of the Wage-Effect Equation
Using equation (10), we can take the difference between period t+p and t for all terms on both sides.
If all terms assumed to be unaffected by immigration, such as At and the productivity parameters,
the θ′s, are dropped, we are left with:
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(30)
where the subscript i denotes the change due to immigration. Since we are interested in the
causal effect of immigration, only the log change in the labour supply aggregates caused by im-
migration is considered. The LHS denotes the immigration-induced log change in workers’ wages
with nativity n, education bk and experience j from period t to period t+p. The first term on
the RHS captures the change in the capital-labour ratio, which depends on the assumptions made
with respect to capital adjustment. This term represents the macroeconomic effect of immigration
on wages. Clearly more intricate are the distributional effects that make up the remainder of the
RHS. They are explained one by one below.
The second term ln
(
Nt+p
Nt
)
i
denotes the change in the total labour aggregate due to immigra-
tion. To calculate this, we sum across all education groups bk ∈ C = {L1, L2,H1} and all experience
groups j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and weight the change of foreign labour supply in every education-experience
cell (bk, j ) with foreign workers’ wage share in period t. Hence:
ln
(
Nt+p
Nt
)
i
=
∑
bk∈C
4∑
j=1
(
sFbkjt
△NFbkjt
NFbkjt
)
, with (31)
sFbkjt =
WFbkjtNFbkjt∑
bk∈C
∑
j WFbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt
The term sFbkjt is the share of the total wage bill in period t that is paid to immigrant workers
with education bk and experience j. The term
△NF bkjt
NF bkjt
is the log change in foreign labour supply
49
in the same group. The next term ln
(
Nb,t+p
Nbt
)
i
in equation (24) measures the impact on wages due
to immigrant inflows in the same broad education group b. Therefore, for each group b, we sum
across all education subgroups k ∈ b and across all experience groups j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and weight the
change in foreign labour supply in each cell (k, j ) with sFbkjt relative to the wage share of group b
in period t :
ln
(
Nb,t+p
Nbt
)
i
=
∑
k∈b
4∑
j=1
(
sFbkjt
sbt
△NFbkjt
NFbkjt
)
, with (32)
sbt =
∑
k∈b
∑
j (W FbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt)∑
bk∈C
∑
j (W FbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt)
The term sbt is the share of the total wage bill in period t going to broad education group b.
The forth term ln
(
Nbk,t+p
Nbkt
)
i
captures the effect of immigration inflows in the same broad education
group b and the same subgroup k. Thus, for each education group bk, we sum across experience
groups j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and weight the change in foreign labour supply in each experience cell j with
sFbkjt relative to the wage share paid to group bk :
ln
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Nbkt
)
i
=
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j=1
(
sFbkjt
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△NFbkjt
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)
, with (33)
sbkt =
∑
j (W FbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt)∑
bk∈C
∑
j (W FbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt)
The sbkt represents the share of the total wage bill going to education group bk. The fifth term
ln
(
Nbkj,t+p
Nbkjt
)
i
captures the effect on workers with the same education bk and experience j. For each
education-experience cell (bk, j ), we weight the change in foreign labour supply with sFbkjt relative
to the wage share paid to all workers in the same group (bk, j ).
ln
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=
(
sFbkjt
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)
, with (34)
sbkjt =
WFbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt∑
bk∈C
∑
j (W FbkjtNFbkjt + WDbkjtNDbkjt)
The sbkjt denotes the share of the total wage bill in period t paid to all workers in group (bk,
j ). The last term in equation (A4) can only be non-zero for foreign workers, i.e. if n=F. This is
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because, by assumption, there is no change in native labour supply due to immigration. Thus, the
last term reads:
ln
(
Nnbkj,t+p
Nnbkjt
)
i
=



△NF bkjt
NF bkjt
if n = F
0 if n = D
(35)
We can now plug in all the expressions derived above in equation (30), so that the effect of
immigration on wages of workers in cell (n, bk, j ) is given by equation (24) in the text. Regarding
(24), note that the wage shares sbt, sbkt and sbkjt can be factored out as they do not enter the
respective summations. In addition, the term IF is an indicator for immigrant workers, i.e. IF =
{1 | n = F}, and equals zero for native workers.
D Aggregation of the Wage Effects
To obtain the effect on the average wage in any nativity-education cell (n, bk), the wage effects
across experience groups j are aggregated within that cell. More precisely, the wage effect on each
experience group j in cell (n, bk) is weighted by snbkjt, the corresponding wage share of the total
wage bill.
(
△wnbkt
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i
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∑
j
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△wnbkjt
wnbkjt
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i
snbkjt
]
∑
j snbkjt
, with (36)
snbkjt =
WnbkjtNnbkjt∑
n
∑
bk∈C
∑
j WnbkjtNnbkjt
If we aggregated up one step further, we can calculate the effect of immigration on the average
wage of natives and immigrants. Therefore, for nativity group n, we weight the effect on each
education-experience group (bk, j ) with snbkjt, its corresponding share of the total wage bill and
sum up across all education-experience groups. For nativity group n, the average wage effect is
then given by:
(
△wnt
wnt
)
i
=
∑
bk∈C
∑
j
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△wnbkjt
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)
i
snbkjt
]
∑
bk∈C
∑
j snbkjt
, for n = D,F (37)
It is worth reminding that it follows from equation (24) that the effects on average wages of
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natives and immigrants are the same if 1/σI = 0. However, if 1/σI > 0, an increase in foreign
labour supply will have a stronger negative impact on average wages of immigrants than on those
of natives. Proceeding in the same fashion, the effect of immigration on the average wage in the
economy can be calculated as follows:
(
△wt
wt
)
i
=
(
△wDt
wDt
)
i
sDt +
(
△wFt
wFt
)
i
sFt , with (38)
snt =
∑
bk∈C
∑
j WnbkjtNnbkjt∑
bk∈C
∑
j (WDbkjtNDbkjt + WFbkjtNFbkjt)
, for n = D,F
The change in the average wage is simply a weighted average of the wage effects on natives and
immigrants, using the wage shares of the nativity groups as weights. Note that there is no denomi-
nator because sDt + sFt = 1. Recall that in the long run,
(
△wt
wt
)
i
= 0 must hold, so that the effects
on immigrants’ wages and natives’ wages cancel out. This was shown by means of equations (9),
which say that immigration does not have any permanent impact on the average national wage
due to full capital adjustment in the long run. Put yet another way, the constant returns to scale
property of the production function implies that a proportionate increase in labour and capital
(as is the case in the long run) increases output by the same amount and leaves factor prices, i.e.
wages, unaffected.
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